

Are CCP the solution to risk management of OTC derivatives

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
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OTC Market Overview


Global OTC derivatives

By data type and market risk category, in trillions of US dollars

Notional amounts outstanding




Gross market values and gross credit exposure




Sources: Central banks of the G10 countries and Switzerland; BIS.

Graph 1

CCP Market Overview



SwapClear Trade Sides Notional Distribution by Currency



Counterparty credit risk in OTC markets

- In a bilateral world each counterparty is at risk and must manage their default risk
- This exposure (replacement risk) needs to be measured and managed
- Most banks have implemented sophisticated risk systems using Monte Carlo simulation approach in order to model this exposure through time and evaluate what would be the worst-case loss scenario
- Risk department uses these risk measures to set tolerance level and maximum allowed risk exposure by counterparty
- Legally most bilateral transactions are executed through an ISDA contract which defines rules and processes for exposure calculation and default handling

Mitigating counterparty credit risk in a bilateral world


- **Bi-lateral Netting**
 - Gives both parties the right to offset positive and negative values of all OTC contracts.
 - This dramatically reduces our bilateral net exposure
- **Collateral**
 - Adding a credit support annex to an ISDA contract allows for exchange of collateral
 - Exposure is margined daily based on a threshold that is agreed between the parties
 - Recent market trend that we have observed is to bring this threshold to \$0 between large financial institution (one main reason behind this is that credit value adjustment charges now incorporate credit risk into the valuation of each transaction)
- **Close-out**
 - Gives us the right to terminate contract with a defaulting counterparty immediately
- **Mutual Put / Break clause**
 - This is a trigger that allows for termination on a pre determined date.
 - Some contract may also contain termination clause below a certain rating or recouponing clause
- **Hedging:**
 - Single name can be hedge using CDS, but this will also create a new counterparty risk

Central clearing counterparties origin?

- **With the recent credit crisis and the failure of some very large financial institutions, existing risk models for pricing derivatives had to be revisited**
- **Current models lack transparency thus creating liquidity constraints within the financial markets**
- **Mispricing of exotic derivatives in conjunction with the lack of proper collateral assessment**
- **CCP has thus emerged out of this crisis as the potential solution to all our problems**
- **Is CCP the sole solution to all our problems?**

Advantages of central clearing

•Multilateral netting



- Contracts traded with different counterparties but cleared through a CCP can be netted
- This particularity has the potential to reduce overall exposure
- Counterparty risk is now with the CCP, eliminates bilateral counterparty risk

Advantages of central clearing counterparty

- **Robust waterfall and mutualization of risk among participants**

- CCP's waterfall mechanism if managed properly should protect non-defaulting members from other members' defaulting
- When a member defaults, the CCP will liquidate the position, if a loss occurs then the defaulting member's initial margin, variation margin and default fund contribution will be used before non-defaulting members have to take a hit
- In such extreme scenarios the loss will be shared among surviving members thus reducing the impact on surviving members

- **Transparency**

- The CCP is the sole calculation agent
- The same pricing model is used for all members cleared through the CCP

- **Capital reduction**

- With Basle III a charge of 2% is expected to be required for transactions cleared through a CCP

- **Legal, Operational and Risk management standardization**

- Centralization of rules, operations and risk management
- CCP provides centralized settlement service, daily margining (in certain cases, margin calls will be up to 6 times a day), netting and risk management function

Disadvantages of central clearing counterparty

- **Limited product coverage**

- Due to the amount of standardisation required only the plain vanilla structure will be cleared at first
- In the recent crisis, counterparty defaults were not caused by the vanilla contracts but the more exotic structure

- **Will multilateral netting really reduce bank exposure**

- It is not obvious that overall exposures will be reduced
- Since only a limited number of trade types can be cleared risk with some counterparties might increase
- As more products are cleared this will be resolved by itself

- **Competition and CCP**

- Having one or few large CCPs maximizes netting but also impose upward pressure on margin requirements
- Having more CCPs will maintain competitive pressure on margins but reduce netting
- Will increase competition increase risk into the CCP model ?

- **Risk Management**

- All the risk analyses is transferred to the CCP, will this weaken the market discipline of each participant
- Lower rated counterparties will be trading on the same platform has better rated firm with the same condition
- Currently in the bilateral world cost of credit is integrated into our PnL (CVA adjustments)

- **What will happen if CCP fails**

- This could be even more catastrophic than what we went through in the last few years

Are CCP's a good thing or bad thing

- The overall purpose of creating CCP makes a whole lot of sense
- Complex OTC Derivative though are different games. Products are highly customized , standardization will be a challenge
- CCP will compete among each other. By shifting the risk management function over to CCP is not a guaranteed safeguard against future potential crisis.
- CCP will face pressure on maintaining adequate margin vs new CCP that will see the day. This will obviously challenge the risk management standard and controls
- Current CCPs are not AAA rated, so risk remains (operational , legal ,...), it is only transferred.
- Banks have invested a lot in counterparty credit risk over the last decade and have sophisticated systems to evaluate that risk; CCP are still at its early stage, a transition period will be required
- Legislation will have to adapt as well, cross border netting across CCP is only one item that will be required in order to mitigate the overall risk

Conclusion

- **CCP are there to stay so we might as well get ready and get familiar with their risk structure**
- **Does this mean that we no longer have to follow our counterparty risk. Not at all, risk will remain as only very few products will be cleared at first**
- **A strong implication of CCP is that the remaining bilateral world will change. As we have seen in recent years, integration of CVA charges in the trading book was a first step, latest development in the CSA to an SCSA agreements with \$0 threshold and standardization of collateral are other good steps in reducing bilateral CCR.**

Reference

- **BIS published statistics; Central banks of the G10 countries and switzerland**
- **Gregory, J, 2009, “Counterparty credit risk – the new challenge for global financial**
- **Are we building the foundations for the next crisis already? The case of central Clearing Jon Gregory,May 2010**